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ABSTRACT 
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Application 
Supervising Professors: LTC (Ret) Dougald MacMillan, Admiral Bob Inman 
 
Since the end of World War II, regional and super powers alike have increasingly 
engaged in proxy conflicts. The Cold War represented a period of conflict characterized 
by a bipolar world and stark ideological differences. This environment resulted in 
ubiquitous proxy conflicts across the world. With the costs of direct warfare increasing 
because of economic interdependence and the rise of regional powers, the United States, 
once again, faces an environment conducive to the spread of proxy conflicts. This thesis 
aims to case study the Greek Civil War and The Congo Crisis to understand the 
strategic objectives of proxy wars and derive historical strategic lessons. Then, with 
those strategic considerations in mind, the thesis will propose a prescriptive matrix 
based on how the United States has engaged in previous proxy wars and future 
strategic objectives. Finally, the thesis will apply this matrix to current proxy war in 
Yemen to assess the utility of a catch-all strategic matrix. The aim of the thesis lies in 
whether or not proxy conflicts can have a normalized, streamlined response from the 
United States. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
Proxy wars are not unique to modern conflict. For hundreds of years, powerful 
states have looked to advance their interest through “war on the cheap.” For example, 
the Romans financially supported factions that opposed Carthage’s rule of Sicily. More 
recently the rigid state structure, international competition for world power status, and 
belief in ideological supremacy are only some of the factors that have led to the 
increased frequency of proxy wars.  
During the aftermath of World War II, the United States’ implementation of the 
Marshall Plan, adherence to containment, and push for the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization fomented an ideological conflict that would persist until the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. Unlike any traditional war between powerful nations, the United 
States and the Soviet Union never fought an official conflict in a singular region. 
Instead, the rise of a bipolar world was defined by a series of smaller conflicts, in 
various parts of the world with the United States and the Soviet Union each seeking to 
garner the most support and fend off the other’s advances into their respective spheres 
of influence. The Cold War provided a perfect environment for proxy wars. Whether it 
was in Vietnam or Afghanistan, the United States and Soviet Union mismanagement of 
proxy wars destabilized the proxy countries for decades after the respective powers 
disengaged from the conflict. 
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Since the Cold War, proxy wars have wreaked havoc in the Middle East. One of 
the most notable examples of this is the current crisis in Yemen. In his article “Proxy 
War Ethics,” Dr. Anthony Pfaff argues that there is “growing assertiveness by regional 
state actors; increasingly capable non-state actors that can project power regionally, if 
not globally.”1 Considering the domestic costs of direct engagement, the United States 
relies on regional powers to advance national security interests in international armed 
conflicts.  
On top of increased reliance of national security partners, Iran and Saudi Arabia 
are locked in a heated battle for regional dominance in the Middle East. This rivalry 
creates proxy conflicts similar to clashes between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. The Yemen Crisis and the Syrian Conflict--both sites of Iran-Saudi Arabia proxy 
wars--have created two of the largest humanitarian crises since World War II. With the 
intensifying conflict between the House of Saud and Iran, increased belligerence by 
Russia, and the militarization by China of the South China Sea, the United States is 
bound to be engaged in future proxy conflicts.  
I will use the Greek Civil War and The Congo Crisis as case studies, gleaning 
lessons learned from each conflict. From the lessons that we have gathered from Cold 
War proxy wars, I will build a strategic matrix to approach proxy wars in the future. I 
will also assume that the United States must get involved in the proxy conflict. Finally, 
                                                            
1 Pfaff, Anthony. "Proxy War Ethics." Journal of National Security Law & Policy 9, no. 2 (August 27, 
2017). 
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the paper will evaluate the strategic matrix by applying the strategy to ongoing proxy 
conflicts in Yemen. Since these conflicts are constantly changing, I will also examine the 
failures and risks in the application of the strategy model.  
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Chapter II: Theories on Proxy Wars 
 
There has been some academic debate on what defines a proxy war. Andrew 
Mumford, in “Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict,” argues that a proxy war is a 
product of a relationship between a benefactor, external to the direct conflict, and the 
chosen proxies who are the recipient of the benefactor’s training, funding, and 
weapons.2 Critically, the Mumford definition requires a benefactor, which could be a 
non-state or state actor that assists a proxy without direct intervention.  
In 1964, in the midst of the Cold War, Karl Deutsch argued that proxy wars are 
“international conflict[s] between two foreign powers, fought out on the soil of a third 
country; disguised as conflict over an internal issue of that country; and using some or 
all of that country’s manpower, resources, and territory as a means for achieving 
preponderantly foreign goals and foreign strategies.”3 Mumford argues that Deutsch’s 
theory on proxy wars is limited to a Cold War context since he did not account for non-
state actors and regional powers. 
Daniel Byman, in “Why Engage in Proxy War? A State’s Perspective” argues that 
proxy wars occur “when a major power instigates or plays a major role in supporting 
and directing a party to a conflict but does only a small portion of the fighting itself.”4 
                                                            
2 Mumford, Andrew. "Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict." The RUSI Journal 158, no. 2 
(2013): 40-46.  
3 Deutsch, Karl. “External Involvement in Internal War.” In Harry Eckstein (Ed) Internal War: 
Problems and Approaches. New York; The Free Press. pp. 100-110. p. 102. 
4 Byman, Daniel L. "Why Engage in Proxy War? A State's Perspective." Brookings.edu. May 22, 
2018. Accessed December 13, 2018. 
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Much like other academic debates on definitions, each rationale brings some salient 
points but also presents shortcomings related to the evolution of the conflict or problem 
over time. The Mumford definition relies on the benefactor being “external to the 
dynamic of an existing conflict.”5 The idea that the benefactor is external to the conflict 
does not weight the far-reaching effect that national security interests could have on the 
benefactor’s homeland. Further, I hold that Deutsch’s analysis is too rigid in the modern 
context. Deutsch’s world view relied on his understanding of a bipolar world which 
excludes non-state actors with the ability to gain territory and destabilize not only 
countries but whole regions. Byman’s analysis, the most recent of the three definitions, 
argues that the benefactor or the power has to engage directly in a small portion of the 
fighting itself. On the other hand, arms transfers and training missions, which have 
characterized the American strategy in Yemen, have become an integral part of how the 
United States engages in proxy wars.  
The arguments presented in this paper will define a proxy war as a conflict in 
which a more powerful benefactor--either a state or non-state--supports politically, 
militarily, or economically, a proxy to advance their national security interest or achieve 
regional stability. Relative to other definitions, I put forth a rationale that is broad. As 
these conflicts continue to evolve, the tenets of what constitutes a proxy war becomes 
                                                            
5 Mumford, Andrew. "Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict." The RUSI Journal 158, no. 2 
(2013): 40-46. 
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muddled because of various factors including rise of non-state actors, violent 
sectarianism, and regional powers vying for influence. 
Proxy War Formation 
Though there are proxy conflicts that are rooted in ancient history, proxy wars 
have become increasingly ubiquitous in a post-Cold War world. Proxy conflicts arise 
when a great power, defined as a hegemon like the United States or the Soviet Union, or 
a regional power want to advance a strategic interest at odds with a rival state. Strategic 
interests include securing a region politically and economically, and combatting rival 
power consolidation. These conflicts are prevalent in a bipolar world or region. During 
the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in proxy conflicts to stem 
the rise of rival political and economic ideologies in their respective spheres of 
influence. The United States and the Soviet Union both came to the same conclusion on 
a direct conflict between each other. The economic and human costs would be too high 
to justify traditional warfare. Instead, a series of conflicts in less powerful nations tested 
the resolve of each superpower. For example, the Greek Civil War, discussed in Chapter 
3, was the first test of the United States’ commitment to minimizing the spread of 
communism in war-torn Europe.  
The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran provide a more modern example of 
how proxy wars form. The two countries vie for regional superiority for a number of 
reasons, including sectarianism and economic competition. Unsurprisingly, 
neighboring nations like Yemen, a country prone to political instability, prove attractive 
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for regional actors to pursue proxy conflicts. Considering the view that strength of 
alliance strongly correlates with regional influence, it follows that it is easier for a 
regional power to achieve power through proxy conflicts rather than bearing the brunt 
of the staggering costs of war.  
Analyzing both past and modern examples, a clear picture depicting the 
components of proxy conflicts begins to emerge. The prerequisite to any proxy conflict 
is a regional or super power to advance a strategic interest that does not warrant the 
burden of direct engagement. In recent times, the calculus for war costs has leaned 
towards to the creation of proxy wars because of nuclearization and economic 
interdependence. Second, there has to be a viable stage. The right playing fields are 
often smaller, poorer nations that are in transition. These nations’ instability provides 
avenues for actors to support their respective sides without strict international 
oversight or condemnation. Finally, there has to be a clear path to victory. Strategically, 
this is a bit harder to discern and should be determined by the government entering 
the proxy conflict. The path to victory should depend on a dichotomy that arises from 
the formation of proxy wars. When working with defined states, the strategic approach 
usually warrants the use of military assets as we will see in the Greek Civil War. On 
the other hand, when dealing with insurrectionary forces or transition attempts, the 
United States often uses intelligence processing as we will see in the Congo Crisis. In 
the next section, I discuss the history and lessons learned from the Greek Civil War. 
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Chapter III: Greek Civil War 
 
The Beginning of the Cold War 
In many ways the Greek Civil War was a formative conflict for the United States’ 
fight against the USSR. The conflict introduced the notion of using proxies to advance 
ideology and control the region. Further, the Truman Doctrine was born out of the need 
for American involvement in Greece.  Overall, the Greek Civil War was an incredibly 
influential conflict for United States foreign policy during the Cold War. This chapter 
will focus on the JUSPMAG and overhauling the strategy of the Greek National Army 
during the Greek Civil War. 
The Conflict  
The Greek Civil War was fought between the existing Greek government – 
backed by the United States and the United Kingdom – and the Democratic Army of 
Greece (DAG), the military arm of the Greek Communist Party. The Greek Civil War 
occurred in three phases. Before international intervention--in 1941--Greece found 
itself in a power vacuum in the wake of the death of fascist leader General Ioannis 
Mextas. This marked the beginning of the First Phase of the Civil War. From this 
vacuum, the Greek Communist Party (KKE), which controlled the National 
Liberation Front (EAM) took power. Against the EAM, the National Republican 
Greek League (EDES) formed to expel the communists from power.  
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In the winter of 1943, war began to break out between the two factions, with 
Britain backing the EDES. This political and societal unrest set the stage for one of the 
first proxy wars in the Cold War era. In 1944, Churchill offered control of Romania to 
the Soviets in exchange for democracy in Greece. In the winter of 1944, the 
nationalists gained control of Greece, with direct British military support. In 1946, 
elections were held in Greece, and thought to be corrupt. The EAM, with newly 
found support, formed the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG), who positioned 
themselves as fighting for Greek revolution. The DAG’s guerilla tactics were 
supported by communist regimes like Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, and they 
gained significant territory during the war. 
Next, we must understand the proxy relationship between the KKE and the 
global communist power structure. In early 1944, “KKE Politburo members Stergios 
Anastasiadis and Andreas Tzimas visited Yugoslavia as well as Bulgaria in November 
1944 to seek support for actions they were contemplating.”6 Greek Communists also 
appealed directly to the USSR. On December 8, 1944, Bulgarian leader Georgi Dimitrov 
forwarded officials in Moscow a request for intervention from a KKE official.7 This 
offer was denied by the USSR, and the Soviet Bloc countries, who werefollowing the 
                                                            
6 Marantzidis, Nikos. "The Greek Civil War (1944-1949) and the International Communist 
System." Journal of Cold War Studies 15, no. 4 (Fall 2013): 25-54. 
7 Ibid, 28. 
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lead of the USSR. Circumstances changed in 1945 with the return to Athens of KKE 
leaders such as Nikos Zahariadis. This signaled a new era in the Greek party’s quest 
for closer ties to surrounding communist factions in the Soviet Bloc. By the end of 1945, 
KKE leaders explored a fresh strategy for a new insurrection. In January of 1946, the 
year that the Third Phase of the Greek Civil War officially began, a KKE convoy 
arrived in Moscow to seek political advice and material assistance.8 Moscow 
prescribed a dual pronged strategy: pursue political agitation while also preparing for 
armed struggle.9 This strategy was designed such that if one avenue failed another 
avenue would be successful at disrupting the democratic efforts. Fundamentally, 
Moscow was promoting the optimal outcome, which was communist control of the 
government, or at the very least communist participation in a more legitimate 
government.  
In March 1946, Zahariadis, leader of the KKE, visited Czechoslovakia to meet 
with Yugoslavian leader Tito and Stalin in the Crimea. This transnational communist 
tour was aimed at the possibility of obtaining solid support from important communist 
leaders. In April 1946, Zaharidas “asked the USSR to approve the creation of guerilla 
and officer training centers to accommodate 8,000 guerrillas in Yugoslavia and 2,000 
                                                            
8 Artiom, Ulunian A. "The Soviet Union and ‘the Greek Question’, 1946–53: Problems and 
Appraisals." 1996, 144-60. 
9 Gaddis, John Lewis. We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998. 
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each in Albania and Bulgaria.”10 KKE leaders were clearly ramping up for a serious 
insurrection. They soon realized that this required international intervention from their 
communist comrades. This represented a turning point in the conflict, basically 
ensuring the break out of a civil war. More importantly, Eastern European bloc 
countries and the Soviet Union escalated commitment to the first armed conflict of the 
Cold War. In fact, Marantzidas posits that “it would be naïve to suggest that a 
communist insurrection could have erupted in Greece in 1946 without the express 
agreement of the leaders of the Soviet and Balkan Communist Parties.”11 In this case, 
foreign intervention directly sparked the proxy war, by escalating the conflict through 
an infusion of hard power. Later in 1946, several of Stalin’s top advisors recommended 
additional aid to the KKE in the form of funds and goods to the insurrection. By 1947, 
“The bulk of supplies sent to Greece—weapons, ammunition, and provisions— 
was transported from Yugoslavia. Initially, the weapons were of German 
origin in order to conceal the identity of the actual suppliers. Aid arriving from 
Albania and Bulgaria also was forwarded to the Greek insurgents through 
Yugoslavia. In addition to weapons, Yugoslavia supplied the KKE with ample 
support for its propaganda needs: The Communists' Free Greece Radio Station 
was transmitting from Yugoslav territory, and Yugoslavia also provided 
                                                            
10 Marantzidis, “The Greek Civil War (1944-1949),” 29. 
11 Ibid, 30. 
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financial assistance for travel, accommodation abroad, contacts, and other 
services. All told, the aid constituted an impressive amount and variety of 
materiel and other support, revealing the Yugoslavs' confidence in the 
prospects of the Greek insurrection.”12 
This intervention from the Soviet Bloc marked the beginning the Second Phase of the 
Greek Civil War. 
On the other side of the conflict, the U.S. and the United Kingdom were also 
ramping up support. In January of 1945, a USSR communication to the United 
Nations accused the United Kingdom troops in Greece of “causing extreme tension 
fraught with the possibility of serious consequences both for the Greek people and for 
the maintenance of peace and security.”13 On February 1, 1945, Churchill wrote to his 
wife: “I am sure in Greece I found one of the best opportunities for wise action that 
this war has tossed to me from its dark waves.”14 Churchill was referring to British 
intervention, including close to 50,000 troops that were stationed in Athens during 
the winter of 1944. In early 1945, the British negotiated a tentative peace between the 
existing government and the EAM. This so-called Varkiza Agreement specified that 
                                                            
12 Ibid, 32. 
13 "Initial Proceedings." In The Greek Question: USSR Communication, 301. Proceedings. United 
Nations. 
14 Iatrides, John O., and Nicholas X. Rizpoulos. "The International Dimension of the Greek Civil 
War." World Policy Journal17, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 87-103. 
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the Communist coalition would have to disarm. This stipulation was never followed 
and the agreement did not impede the inevitable conflict between the KKE and 
republican forces. Undeterred by Churchill’s electoral defeat in July 1945, the United 
Kingdom “provided economic, military and technical assistance.”15 The British 
military “trained the new Greek armed forces and police and selected their senior 
commanders.”16 In a unexpected move, the cash-poor and war ravaged Britain could 
not sustain support in the conflict. 
Almost immediately after Britain had announced a continuation of aid to the 
Greek government, President Truman went to Congress to garner military support for 
the Greek government. From Truman’s plea, the United States adopted the Truman 
Doctrine, a policy that established that “the United States would provide political, 
military and economic assistance to all democratic nations under threat from external 
or internal authoritarian forces.”17 This policy inherently opened up the United States 
to enter into proxy wars because it justified military backing of pro-Western factions 
around the world. In late 1947, the United States created the American Mission to Aid 
Greece (AMAG) to infuse political support and military aid to the Greek government.  
Upon Congressional approval, President Truman ordered the War Department to 
                                                            
15 Ibid, 98. 
16 Ibid, 99. 
17 "The Truman Doctrine, 1947." U.S. Department of State. Accessed May 12, 2019.  
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assess and deploy the supplies and equipment needs of Greek forces. According to 
White House documents, Truman appointed Dwight Griswold to head up the AMAG, 
while Ambassador Lincoln McVeigh was to lead political discussion with the Greek 
government.18 Despite $171 million in US military aid, the national army was not able 
to defeat insurgent communist forces. The failure of the American strategy led to the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff escalating military assistance from aid to intensified support. 
The initial Greek military strategy had three phases. First, it employed a pincer 
movement in a particular region to trap the guerrilla bands. The second phase 
involved mopping up operations to defeat any remaining elements in the region. These 
stay-back forces were used to secure large swaths of land.  Last, the process would be 
replicated across different regions in Greece. The overarching strategy failed, because 
of the nature of the enemy. Before the Greek army could execute the pincer movement, 
rebel forces easily maneuvered out of range. The local population did not cooperate 
with the army in locating rebels because they feared retaliation from rebel forces. The 
Greek army committed more stay-behind forces to protect local communities, which 
significantly weakened the ability for offensive operations. The KKE created 
communist controlled zones from the substantial loss of the Greek Army. Specifically, 
the communist forces were able to maintain control of rural mountains. These zones 
                                                            
18 Monthly Report on American Mission for Aid to Greece, with attachments, September 20, 
1947. Truman Papers, President's Secretary's Files. Greece. 
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provided strategic benefits for the rebels including centralization and organization to 
conduct operations.19 
American Involvement: the Truman Doctrine 
The United States then proposed the formation of the National Defense Corps, 
diverting funds allocated for the Greek National Army (GNA) to create twenty  500 - 
man battalions. These battalions would defend towns and take over static defense 
missions. This freed up the GNA to conduct offensive missions; yet, the threat of 
communist victory still loomed. On December 31, 1947, the Joint United States Military 
Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) was formed. The purpose of JUSMAPG 
was simple: “to assist Greek armed forces in re-establishment of internal security in 
Greece at the earliest practicable date and to reduce Communistic inspired guerrilla 
movement.”20 
The Joint Chiefs gave William C. Livesay command of both JUSMAPG and 
United States Army Group-Greece (USAGG), a subsection of the American Mission for 
Aid to Greece (AMAG). Livesay built a new advisory organization as the 170 (90 
officers and 80 soldiers) newly assigned personnel began arriving in Greece in 
December of 1947 and January of 1948.21 Livesay had two criteria for the officer 
                                                            
19 Harris, William. "Instilling Aggressiveness US Advisors and Greek Combat Leadership in the 
Greek Civil War." Combat Studies Institute: Art of War Papers, 2013. 
20 "The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Secretary of State." Henry Gracy to Secretary of 
State George Marshall. November 28, 1947. 
21 Harris, “Instilling Aggressiveness,” 49. 
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advisors: graduation of the Command and General Staff College and combat 
experience.22 He created four sections to advise the Greek General Staff on personnel, 
intelligence, operations, and logistics. The General Staff advisors and Livesay, as the 
chief advisor and member of Supreme National Defense Council, had five tasks: 
monitoring the military situation, “formulate plans for the employment and 
coordination of the Armed Forces of Greece,”23 advise the Joint Chiefs and the Chief of 
AMAG on how to use the Greek military, provide operational advice, and ensure that 
“operational returns are commensurate with the aid furnished.”24 The wording of the 
second and fifth tasks clearly indicates that Livesay and JUSMAPG intended to have a 
significant level of influence over Greek military operations. Livesay also created 
eleven field teams to provide operational support and streamline advice to the Greek 
National Army. The field teams and the General Staff advisors spent the first months 
in Greece assessing native military capabilities.  The assessment was designed to 
culminate in a plan to win the war for the Greek government. The evaluation also 
relied on increasing financial aid to the Greek National army to expand forces by 
                                                            
22 Ibid, 49. 
23 Plans and Operations Division, “Future Concept and Objectives of Military Aid for Greece,” 
Records of the Army Staff, Plans and Operations Division, National Archives and Records 
Administration, College Park, MD, Records Group 319, Entry 153, Decimal File 091, Box 74; US 
Army, JUSMAPG, 46. 
24 Ibid, 45. 
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150,000 men.25 Military advisors soon moved beyond assessment into influencing the 
strategy of the GNA. Livesay, in his guidance to his advisors, stated “you must insist 
on aggressive action . . . we must instill aggressiveness in them; they must carry the 
fight to the bandits.”26 The United States suggested that American advisors use three 
primary methods to instill aggressiveness: daily mentorship, direct orders, and 
disciplinary action.27 Livesay specifically directed his subordinates to ”maintain close 
personal contact with lower echelons . . . to insure aggressive action.”28 This 
aggressiveness of the military soon boiled over to the point where US combat troops 
were leading operations against rebel forces. In summation, after landing in Greece, 
United States’ military advisors significantly increased the aggressiveness of the GNA. 
With increased control of the Greek General Staff by American troops, the Prime 
Minister of Greece and King Paul began negotiations with the US and British 
Ambassador to formalize and codify the role of US troops. The main goal of the Greek 
government in these negotiations was to maintain autonomy for the GNA Chief of 
Staff as the source of tactical orders for the Greek military. While this meant that US 
and British Advisors were not allowed to command forces, the new agreement 
                                                            
25 Livesay, William, Cable to Director Plans and Operations, 22 January 1948, Records of 
Interservice Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory Group Greece, National 
Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, Records Group 
26 Livesay William, untitled speech, 16 January 1948, William Livesay Papers, Military History 
Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 4. 
27 Harris, “Instilling Aggressiveneess,” 80. 
28 US Army, JUSMAPG, 153-154. 
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stipulated that “all questions of command, organization and training, the strategy and 
tactics of the anti-guerrilla campaign, all plans of contemplated operations, all laws 
and decrees affecting the army, and all appointments or promotions to the rank of 
brigadier or higher” had to be approved by U.S. military advisors.29  
Almost immediately, after the order went into effect, the JUSMAPG General 
Staff advisors began putting together an offensive strategy against rebel strongholds in 
certain regions of the country. More specifically, American advisors suggested an 
attack on the Roumeli region of Greece (See dark region in Appendix A).30 
Notwithstanding protests from Greek officers, the U.S. army officers were able to 
overrule the Greek officers. The General Staff also begrudgingly adopted US 
suggestions and built mobile reserve forces aimed at countering guerilla operations. 
The increased control of the U.S. army changed the GNA’s strategy from static troop 
placement to a more flexible strategy.31 
JUSMAPG Operations: 1948 
This period of time marked the escalation of the Cold War, and the intensity of 
support from the United States to different regions began to increase. Instead of 
focusing on Greece and Turkey, the United States shifted its focus to developments in 
                                                            
29 Ibid, 57. 
30 "Map Regions and Prefectures." Map of the Regions and Prefectures of Greece. Accessed May 
12, 2019. https://www.sfakia-crete.com/sfakia-crete/prefecturesregions.html. 
31 Ibid, 61. 
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China. In addition, the Berlin blockade forced the United States to divert air-based 
support from the Royal Hellenic Air Force. The Democratic Army and the KKE gained 
momentum in the conflict due to the lack of focus from the United States in early 1948. 
Support from Soviet bloc countries continued despite the Soviet Union’s lack of 
participation, and had a marked impact on battle outcomes.  
In early 1948, the Greek government was losing ground not only due to a 
stagnant military strategy but also a lack of grassroot support stemming from an ailing 
economy. The JUSMAPG-based economic advice had stabilized inflation. Economic 
improvement legitimized the government and U.S. involvement. In September of 1948, 
Truman appointed Henry Grady as Ambassador to Greece and head of AMAG.32 This 
improved the unity of command and bypassed many of the problems of dual 
command from Griswold and McVeigh. Grady oversaw the 1949 Peloponnesian 
operation which integrated economic reconstruction and development so as to lay 
down the roots for support for democracy in Greece. In this operation, the American 
advisors prioritized humanitarian aid, a six-month reconstruction project, and long-
term infrastructure project. This economic aid provided an early test for the Marshall 
Plan’s ability to sustain democracy in a war-torn country. 
                                                            
32 US Army, JUSMAGG: History 25 March 1949-30. June 1950, Records of Interservice 
Organizations, Joint United States Military Advisory Group Greece, Records Group 334, Entry 
154, Historical File, Box 146  
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Alongside economic aid, the United States was able to ramp up its operational 
aggressiveness. In 1948, facing a shrinking budget, the United States was able to advise 
on offensive operations that shifted the momentum in the conflict. In April 1948, 
Operation Dawn, the aforementioned operation in the Roumeli region, represented a 
significant improvement in the eyes of U.S. military advisors. There were 2,000 
communist troops interdicting roads coming in and out of Athens, isolating the capital 
from the rest of the country.33 JUSMAPG advisors had a pivotal role in correcting 
deficiencies present with the GNA’s initial plans. More specifically, U.S. advisors 
found that the structure of the offensive and the double battalion concept were 
inefficient. The GNA was successful in regaining the territory with a overhauled battle 
strategy.  
In June 1948, JUSMAPG advised the Greek government to build upon the 
momentum of Operation Dawn with Operation Crown. Operation Crown aimed to 
“break the back of the bandit gangs [that] year.”34 Roughly, the plan was to invade 
rebel strongholds in the Grammos Mountains, which was “the nerve center of the 
communist forces in Greece.” 35  The operation occurred in three phases. First, GNA 
forces were supposed to clear areas near the rebel-controlled base. Then, the GNA was 
                                                            
33 Harris, “Instilling Aggressiveness,” 74. 
34 "Griswold to Secretary of State." Dwight Griswold to Secretary of State George Marshall. June 
16, 1948. 
35 Ibid, 1. 
Venkatraj 21 
 
tasked with attacking certain points along the Democratic Army’s outer defense lines. 
Last, GNA was to isolate the rebels in the Grammos mountains by cutting lines of 
communication to communist governments like Albania.36 The operation timeline was 
supposed to be conducted swiftly; nevertheless, the GNA forces moved too slowly and 
incurred too many casualties. Van Fleet identified one of the leaders of the GNA as the 
reason for the inefficiency during the offensive. Van Fleet quickly recommended 
removal to the Greek General staff. This request was immediately supported by the 
Greek government. The Greek government then put Van Fleet at the head of hiring the 
new corps leader.37 Apart from the slowness of the operation and many casualties, the 
offensive was successful in isolating and damaging the headquarters of the rebels. 
After a series of operations and strained relations between Stalin and Bloc 
countries, the rebels began to incur a series of losses. The demoralized DAG had 
incurred massive casualties as the Soviet Bloc support began to wane due to political 
movements beyond their control. By the end of 1949, communist factions had been 
imprisoned, executed, or exiled. The Greek Civil war was an important conflict for the 
United States because it proved, to the international community and to powers in 
America, that intervention from the United States on behalf of a proxy could be 
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successful in denying the spread of communism. The overhaul of military 
infrastructure would become positive case study on how the United States can 
intervene against a guerilla force. 
All in all, continual operations that were overseen by JUSMAPG and the United 
States substantively weakened the power of the DAG and the KKE. In this case, the 
United States effectively use of military advisors, hard power aid, and economic 
reconstruction in solidifying democracy in Greece. The following lessons learned from 
the employment of these resources will analyze and generalize the costs and benefits of 
military overhaul and the prospect of unified command structure. 
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Lessons Learned 
The overarching lesson learned revolves around the United States’ military 
means of controlling outcomes in the Greek Civil War. The United States used the 
USAGG and conventional diplomatic channels to monitor the elections. JUSMAPG 
provided an overarching council that promoted unity of command and organization of 
naval and air resources.  These organizations defined the United States’ involvement in 
the proxy conflict. This section will attempt to generalize the positives and negatives of 
the operation. 
One of the most important takeaways stems from the use of military advisors. 
The Greek Civil War provides an important case study on how military advisors can 
interface with a government. The JUSPMAG was not just a military action group, 
instead its political ties with the Prime Minister and cabinet in Greece facilitated the 
changes in strategy that were necessary for the success of the GNA. For example, Van 
Fleet had moderate control over who was leading troops during operations. This 
meant that the head of JUSPMAG could not only dictate strategy but also choose who 
executed his strategy. In the context of a military-based proxy conflict, the political 
relationship between the proxy and the nation supplying support relies on a mutual 
understanding on level of commitment. The United States’ commitment of advisors 
hinged on the buy-in of the Greek government’s General Staff. Extending this further, 
the political ties with the proxy government determines the accesses of the advisors. In 
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the early days of the JUSPMAG, military advisors were met with disdain from all 
levels of the army. After codifying military intervention into a set of rules, aggressive 
operations and training the GNA became easier. Therefore, the relationship with the 
proxy government could act as a litmus test for American commitment. The strategic 
objective for the United States was denying communism a win during the early stages 
of the Cold War. Without the removal of barriers from the proxy, the United States 
probably would not have been as effective in organization and the transfer of military 
aid to the Royal Hellenic Navy and Air Force. The militarization of a political 
relationship can provide pivotal access to change the strategy and capabilities of the 
proxy. 
Apart from the political posturing, the JUSMAPG was vital for military victory. 
Specifically, the reliance on makeshift organizations like the JUSMAPG has a number 
of benefits. First, JUSMAPG provided the infrastructure to move resources and oversee 
allocation.  United States military support faces issues with misuse or loss of resources. 
Exporting our military logistics and bureaucracy means we can extract more 
incremental value from our support by minimizing resource loss. Second, JUSMAPG 
also provided reasons for a unified command when entering proxy wars. Proxy wars 
can uniquely entangle the power in long term conflicts. One predominant reason for 
this lies in the lack of unified command for U.S. resources. Unifying efforts under a 
joint operation sanctioned by the National Security Council clearly defines the strategic 
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objective and streamlines decision making. An organization like JUSMAPG can limit 
mission creep, defined as an over commitment of resources, by hedging against the 
actions of individual organizations and instilling discipline of the advisors. In 
summation, creating unified bodies of command hedges potential risks of further 
entanglement.  
Lastly, a military overhaul strategy would only be warranted in the wake of 
total military failure. Our operations in Greece were high risk, high reward in that 
America could have been ensnared in an unwinnable conflict if the Soviet bloc were a 
stronger force. That being said, the combination of economic aid and the Marshall Plan 
aligned the United States short-term and long-term interests. To win the conflict, the 
United States needed the support of the local population and the their belief in their 
government. If America chooses to enter these future conflicts, then democracy 
promotion and a stable Western-friendly government is a long-term interest across 
conflicts. The emphasis on stable economic reconstruction was a boon for the Greek 
people, and advanced the idea of legitimate democracy as a goal for the native 
population. 
All in all, the United States can use organizations like the JUSMAPG to 
efficiently advance long-term and short-term conflicts while minimizing the traditional 
downsides of proxy conflicts. 
Venkatraj 26 
 
Chapter IV: The Congo Crisis 
 
In Chapter I of this thesis, I argued that political upheaval provided super 
powers with the opportunity to advance security interests in a region. The Congo Crisis, 
which occurred over a five-year span between from 1960 to 1965, forced the United 
States to engage in conflict in a region where its existing intelligence and diplomatic 
efforts were weak. The overarching goal was preventing the Soviet Union from 
attaining vast cobalt reserves that were necessary for a burgeoning weapons 
development. This chapter will outline the early parts of the Congo Crisis, focusing on 
the intelligence community’s role on goal setting and inciting political change in the 
country. 
Congo Crisis: Early Stages 
Post World War II, traditional imperialism was being challenged across the 
world. During the 1950s, the Belgian Congo was experiencing the precursors to 
revolution to overthrow their colonial occupiers. There was increasing unrest linked to 
localized militias and the formation of political organizations. King Leopold II had 
exploited the natural resources of the Congo, instituted a slave labor system, and 
massacred millions of native Congolese. The war crimes and misrule committed by 
King Leopold II had a marked impact on the future of Congolese politics, in that the 
legacy of his actions fomented economic and political oppression. The dehumanization 
of the colonized and the exploitation of the natural resources of the land led to political 
organization in the Congo. Despite the legacy of King Leopold II and the atrocities of 
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the Congo Free State, the thesis will limit its historical analysis to the 1950s and 1960s 
due to role of the United States’ interest during the Cold War. 
Like most colonial rulers, Belgium owned the infrastructure and means of 
economic development of in the Congo, meaning that the lack of economic 
advancement for the native population added intense motivation for organization. 
Larry Devlin, the former CIA Chief of Station for the Congo during the crisis, argued 
that “the real flaw in the Belgian government’s strategy…was that political 
development lagged way behind the social and economic transformation [of the 
Congo].”38 By the late 1950s, Belgium viewed the Congo as still being many years away 
from independence, while the Congolese began to organize into political parties that 
were aimed at destabilizing colonial rule.  
1959-1960: Revolution Galvanizes 
During the late 1950s, the Congolese did receive some democratic concessions 
from the Belgian government, including the formation of political parties in 1956 and 
their first local elections in December 1957. This was part of a larger plan to let the 
Congolese have political freedoms, but to centralize economic and military power 
around the Belgian government.39 The plan for a politically autonomous Congo was 
summarized in the 30-year Plan, published in February 1956 by Colonial University at 
Antwerp professor A. A. J. Van Bilsen. There were two main reactions from the 
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Congolese. The first reaction came from a group of African Catholic intellectuals called 
African Consciousness.40 This group had many figures that would go on to play an 
influential role in Catholicism in Central Africa. They endorsed the plan as a jumping 
off point for civil discourse over the future of the Congo.  There was a more radical 
response from the Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO), led by Joseph Kasavubu. In a 
“manifesto,” ABAKO rejected the Van Bilsen plan as too reserved and demanded 
immediate emancipation from the Belgian government. The counter manifesto stated 
“to the question whether we want later to remain united with Belgium we reply: we do 
not in any way want the Congo to be integrated with the Belgian State.”41  Over the next 
three years, political revolution fomented around complete political, economic, and 
military autonomy from the Belgian State. 
In January 1959, Leopoldville (Kinshasa), a major population center in the 
Belgian Congo, broke out into massive riots in response to political repression by the 
Belgian government. A 1959 edition of “The World Today,” a publication from the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, wrote that “the riots in Leopoldville of January 
4, 1959 ended the illusion that the Belgian Congo was a country of ever-increasing 
prosperity, with a contented population whose standards of living were rising.”42 After 
witnessing post-colonial revolutions in Algeria and Ghana, the Belgian government 
decided to abandon the notion of slowly phasing in political freedom. To all the 
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traditional colonial powers, it was clear that political revolution had gripped the whole 
continent of Africa, and Belgium was reacting to the winds of change. 
The ABAKO party, led by the Bakongo people, received blame for inciting the 
riots. On the other hand, this did not result in the political stability that the Force 
Publique anticipated, instead, the Bakongo people organized and staged a boycott of 
government services in the Lower Congo.43 While the Bakongo were beginning to 
organize, the European population were uneasy, especially considering the bloody 
conflict between France and Algeria’s independence movement. Vanthemsche argued 
that though the riots were “quickly and bloodily repressed [and] they had a major 
psychological impact on both black and white populations.”44 The sense of urgency 
intensified due to both the political revolutionaries within the Congo and in domestic 
politics in Belgium. In a radio speech on January 13, 1959, King Baudoin I, the King of 
Belgium at the time, revealed his support for Congolese independence on certain 
conditions.  
The term independence ended any ongoing political debates within the Belgian 
legislature on potentially retaining the Congo. But, Vanthemsche posed a question that 
had to be answered: “what did the term independence actually mean?”45 There was a 
semblance of a plan put forth by the Belgian government soon after the statement from 
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the king. This statement lacked clarity in regards to the time table for a fully 
independent Congo.  The plan included a transitional period where people would have 
limited access to executive and legislative power, racial discrimination would be 
abolished over time, and implementation of a parish election system. Furthermore, the 
proliferation of Congolese political parties demanded different forms of independence. 
The loudest voice at this point came from ABAKO who demanded immediate, 
unequivocal independence and championed themselves as the party for Congolese 
independence. During the crisis, Civilisations, characterized the ABAKO sentiment as 
“not interested in a type of independence which is granted [them] or even pressed upon 
[them] by the Metropolitan country; independence [was] something that must assert 
itself.”46 While the ABAKO garnered political support from their Bakongo base, there 
was increasing political fragmentation based on ethno-political lines. For example, the 
Congolese National Movement (MNC) gained most of its supporters from the Balubas 
in the Kasai region and ethnic groups from the Orientale Province. Along with ethnicity 
question, political parties had to answer the constitution question. This created 
infighting in the parties themselves. Returning to the MNC example, the party divided 
into the MNC-Lumumba and MNC-KaIonji, each with differing views on whether the 
Congo should be a unitary state. Like the MNC-Kalouji, ABAKO argues for a federal 
Congo, with decentralized federalism. In Katanga, the Conakat party led by, Moise 
Tshombe, was a separatist party that believed that the mineral rights of Katanga 
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belonged to the ethnic Katanganese.47 In early 1960, Belgium hosted the Roundtable 
Conference, which was a meeting between grassroots political leaders from the Congo 
and members of the Belgian government. There it was decided to grant autonomy to the 
Congo on June 30, 1960. This included a phasing in of concessions that would move the 
Congolese towards full autonomy. There would still be vestiges of the Force Publique, 
Belgian technical experts, and businesses monitoring natural resource investment. The 
reason for the rapid call for independence from the Belgian government related to 
outpacing radicalization to preserve the Belgian economic position. That being said, on 
the cusp of independence, in the Congo the formation of tribal associations would 
prove paramount for super powers interested in gaining a foothold in the region. 
May to June 1960 
On June 30, 1960, the Congo officially declared independence. Before the official 
declaration, the Congolese held national elections in May of 1960. Elections so soon 
after the Roundtable Conference created cleavages that harkened back to the radical 
versus moderate divide centered on the federalism question during the 1950s. Also, 
there was distrust among three of the most influential political leaders of the time: 
Patrice Lumumba, Moise Tshombe, and Joseph Kasavubu. According to Leo Zeilig, 
Tshombe and Lumumba clashed at the Roundtable meetings, because Lumumba 
“feared that federalism for Tshombe was a cloak for concealing ambitions to head an 
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independent Katanga.”48 During the revolution process, Kasavubu and Lumumba 
clashed on the nuances of revolution, with Kasavubu arguing that Lumumba’s plan for 
independence was far too moderate.49 From the Roundtable Conference, Lumumba ,out 
of imprisonment from Elisabethville,  dominated the rhetoric from the Congolese. He 
gained notoriety for publicly rejecting the idea that the Belgian King could be head of 
the new Congolese state. This garnered negative views from the Belgian government, 
who began to characterize Lumumba as a communist revolutionary. Lumumba was 
solidified as the leader of the revolution towards Congolese independence.  
On May 22, 1960, the MNC, led by Lumumba, won 33 seats in the federal 
government including Lumumba himself becoming Prime Minister of the new state. 
The next two parties, Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA) and ABAKO, won 13 and 12 seats 
respectively. Political power was to be shared due to the Senate, just a couple of days 
later, electing Joseph Kasavubu as the first president of the Congo. Considering the 
power sharing between the Prime Minister and President codified in the Loi 
Fondamentale, these two men were pitted against each other at the outset of the new 
nation. The government was now solidified and tasked with developing an economy, 
workable political system, and avoiding ethnic conflicts 
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July 5, 1960 
During the transition to independence, the Roundtable Conference stipulated 
that Belgian officers would remain in the country to lead new the Congolese army and 
more importantly to protect the existing European population. On July 5, 1960, the 
Congolese armed forces mutinied against the existing Belgian officers, marking the 
beginning of the Congo Crisis. The demands from the Congolese fighting force 
included higher pay and advancement opportunities. There was also pent-up 
resentment over the continued subservience to white military officers. The revolution 
spread to other military bases, causing mass panic among the European settlers. 
International media received reports of grotesque violence against the existing 
Europeans. Four days later the Belgian government intervened, sending military forces 
to squash the rebellion. To maintain international autonomy, Lumumba and Kasavubu 
made an appeal to the United Nations to condemn the actions of the Belgian 
government as an autonomous state. After another four days, the United Nations 
accepted the claim that Belgium was recolonizing the Congo. On the same day, 
Tshombe declared that Katanga would secede from the newly formed state. As stated 
before, the Katanga region was vital for future economic growth for the Congo via the 
exporting of natural resource. The Belgian government viewed this favorably since 
much of the private capital into the Congo flowed through Katanga and Belgian mining 
companies feared nationalization from the “radical” MNC government. It’s worth 
noting that the United States voted with the USSR to pressure Belgium “to withdraw 
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troops from the Republic of Congo.”50 Along with the condemnation of the Congo, the 
United Nations also instituted the United Nations Operation in the Congo (UNOC). 
UNOC represented one of the first multilateral peace keeping missions from the United 
Nations. The aim of UNOC was to keep the integrity of Congolese autonomy, maintain 
law and order, and provide governmental technical assistance.51 One important tenet of 
UNOC was impartiality, meaning UNOC remained neutral on the internal secession 
movement from Katanga. A National Security Briefing dated July 25, 1960, describes 
Lumumba as a “major negative factor in [the] present Congo situation.”52 The briefing 
also describes potential Soviet ties to Lumumba, due to the President’s threats to seek 
out Soviet assistance in stabilizing the new state.53 CIA intelligence also pointed to early 
Soviet involvement in the region. With revolutionary conflicts in Ghana and Guinea, the 
Soviet Union sensed the opportunity for economic and political influence in the region 
and moved personnel into key strategic areas of the Congo in July and August of 1960.12 
Moreover, the CIA found Red Cross marked crates filled with Soviet weaponry. The 
thesis from the CIA station chief was that the USSR were planning support for another 
rebellion before July 5, 1960.54 Due to the events of July 1960, Central Africa was in play 
for the United States and the USSR. 
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To reiterate, the American view of Lumumba was that of a communist 
sympathizer; but, as Devlin stated, there was no reason to believe that Lumumba was 
directly a Soviet Agent. Against this notion, a telegram from the station in the Congo to 
the CIA on August 11, 1960, reveals that Lumumba was moving left and communist 
influence was increasing.55 The thesis from the agency was that unless Lumumba was 
removed from power he would install a communist regime, or at the very least, a 
regime predisposed towards supporting the Soviet cause.56 In the same telegram, the 
station recommends support for political minorities to exacerbate ethno-political 
conflict, use embassy contacts to influence the Senate as a counter balance to Lumumba, 
and directly infiltrate the government through U.S. controlled assets. These actions 
could only be described as a political warfare, a common component of the power-
proxy relationship. This strategy would prove difficult because of massive political 
party turnover. Even compared to prerevolutionary political conditions, the Congo was 
beginning to further divide on ethno-political lines. Kasavubu and Lumumba detested 
each other based on a number of factors including difference of ethnicity, the power 
sharing agreement codified in the Constitution, and Lumumba’s actions during the 
Roundtable Conference. Taking into consideration the division of the political system 
and United States’ reservations about Lumumba, many political actors sought help 
from America in hopes of unseating the Lumumba administration. On the topic of 
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recruiting assets, Devlin noted that his visitors included Congolese politicians and tribal 
leaders like Albert Kalonji, the leader of the Baluba tribe in Southern Kasai. His faction 
of the MNC broke off from Lumumba, because he saw the prime minister as 
responsible for the death of many of his tribesman. Efforts at creating political 
instability to undermine Lumumba picked up after unsuccessful meetings with the new 
prime minster in Washington D.C.57  By August 1960, Lumumba “appeared to many 
Western nationals to be on the same track as other leaders who believed they could use 
the Soviet Union without falling under its sway.”58 Devlin goes on to state that the 
Soviets had developed a reputation for incentivizing dependence from developing 
countries via aid packages and military support. Once the dependence was created, the 
Soviets “could be expected to remove their velvet gloves and demand payment in the 
form of control.”59 
By early August of 1960, the relationship between Lumumba and the Secretary 
General of the UN Dag Hammarskjöld had drastically deteriorated. Lumumba wanted 
the United Nations to expel Belgian troops and run the operation to reunite Katanga 
and the Congo. Hammarskjöld held the view that the matter of Katanga secession was 
an internal political matter and that he could only guarantee expulsion of Belgian 
troops. Lumumba vitriolically attacked the United Nations. These attacks were publicly 
backed by the Soviet Union, who blamed the United Nations for an incident in which 
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eleven Canadian Airmen were beaten by Congolese troops at the Ndjili airport. The 
USSR also noted that the use of NATO technicians could warrant further action from 
Soviet Union. Lumumba, aiming to gain more control over the internal affairs of the 
country, demanded that the United Nations vacate control over the Ndjili Airport. In 
early August, South Kasai seceded from Katanga with support from Belgian mining 
companies, calling themselves “the Mining State of Kasai.” The second secession 
movement was let by Albert Kalonji who was a leader in the Baluba tribe. Lumumba 
was tasked with reeling in two newly independent states, to the Congo, another new 
state fraught with violent ethnic and political conflict. The Soviet Union knew this to be 
the case and acted swiftly. Seeing the disorganization of the Congolese military, the 
Soviet Union told the Congolese government that they were sending Ilyushin-14 planes, 
complete with crews, technicians, and interpreters.60 The Soviets were making a move 
that the United States had been worried about. The Soviet Union “intended to intervene 
directly in the Congo rather than channeling its assistance through the United 
Nations.”61 Ministers and close advisors of Lumumba began to posture towards the 
rhetoric used communist leaders. For example, Lumumba’s minister of information and 
minister of education used public statements and enacted policies that had 
underpinnings of Soviet influence. The CIA and NSC seemed to be witnessing the 
beginning of a communist takeover in the Congo. This takeover would provide the 
Soviet Union access to the rest of Central Africa. Tangibly, this meant that the Soviet 
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Union would have a near monopoly over strategic minerals like cobalt, a mineral used 
in a variety of defense technologies.62 Control over these resources would hamstring the 
United States’ own weapon and space programs. The United States would act at all 
costs to prevent the Congo from falling into the hands of the Soviets. That meant that 
the only course of action was unseating Lumumba by any means possible. On August 
12th, a telegram from Langley to the CIA station in the Congo states that “state reps, 
while fully concurring in assessment as Lumumba as continuing threat to Western and 
UN purposes and increasingly susceptible Commie line and tactics, felt this removal 
might breed more problems.”63 The CIA was cautious about their strategy to unseat 
Lumumba, in that removal would further destabilize the Congo, leaving the Soviets 
with another opening to take control over the country. By August 27th, approximately 
two weeks later, a similar telegram from Langley stated: 
“In high quarters here it is the clear-cut conclusion that if Lumumba continues to 
hold high office, the inevitable result will at best be chaos and at worst pave the 
way to Communist takeover of the Congo with disastrous consequences for the 
prestige of UN and for the interests of the free world generally.”64  
These two telegrams give insight as to how fast the crisis was moving, and the United 
States realized that the removal of Lumumba was a prerequisite for a pro-American 
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Congo. Only ten days later, the CIA station received reports that Kasavubu announced 
that he would remove Lumumba from his position as prime minister and replaced him 
with Joseph Ileo. According to U.S. intelligence, Kasavubu’s transition plan included 
UNOC coordination to maintain order and guarantee his safety. In response, Lumumba 
announced that he was dismissing Kasavubu as president of the Congo. At this point, 
the United States and Soviets were at odds from an information perspective. Soviet and 
Eastern European journalists were able to file their story at the behest of Lumumba’s 
government, while Western journalists were denied access to the radio stations, barring 
them from filing their version of political upheaval. Information warfare would be 
important in shaping the views of the international community. Western journalists 
provided stories of how the youth of Leopold supported Kasavubu. The United States’ 
next step was to incite a vote of no confidence against Lumumba in the Senate. 
However, this plan was defeated when Lumumba, an incredibly skilled orator, spoke 
on the floor of the Congolese senate for close to two hours. The vote ended 47 to 2 and 7 
abstentions against the vote of no-confidence. Notwithstanding the vote of no 
confidence, Lumumba’s days as Prime Minister of the country were numbered.65 
The Rise of Mobutu 
The answer to the Lumumba question came in the form Colonel Joseph Mobutu, the 
chief of staff of the army under the sitting prime minister. On initial reflection, Clare 
Timberlake, the ambassador to Congo during the crisis, had “Mobutu pegged for 
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moderate, a really competent guy.”66 Most importantly, Mobutu was not sympathetic to 
the communists. During his first meeting with Devlin, Mobutu expressed concerns with 
Soviet involvement in the economy of the Congo. He argued that the Soviets were 
attempting to re-colonize the Congo. Most importantly, Mobutu took issue with Soviet 
involvement with the military affairs with the fledgling country.67 At this juncture, 
Mobutu sought help from the United States to install a government, unseating 
Kasavubu and Lumumba. In a truly amazing feat of bravery, at the initial meeting with 
Mobutu, Devlin promised that the United States would recognize the government that 
Mobutu would install without approval from CIA headquarters. Devlin also promised 
economic resources to the coup and the subsequent government that Mobutu would 
install. On September 14, 1960, Mobutu suspended the constitution and removed 
Lumumba from power. In his first radio address to the people of the Congo, Mobutu 
decried the Soviet Union intervention in the military and immediately expelled the 
communist contingent from the country. A key feature of the new government was the 
elevation of college-educated Congolese technocrats to positions of power. This 
governing body was called the ”College of Commissars.” When reporting the coup 
d’état to CIA Headquarters, he used the code word “flash,” signifying a declaration of 
war. According to Devlin, this was the first time that Eisenhower had heard a detailed 
account of the United States involvement in the coup in the Congo.68 In recognizing the 
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government, the State Department had an issue because the coup was in direct conflict 
with the post-revolution constitution.  In a meeting with the CIA post-coup, Mobutu 
was adamant that reinstating Kasavubu would further delegitimize the new 
government. Devlin argued that the coup government, as it was, did not garner 
international legitimacy. Many of his CIA colleagues argued that Devlin was 
mishandling this situation by handling Mobutu as a cooperator rather than a recruited 
agent. With an agent, it would be easier to direct orders and policy coming from the 
central government of the Congo.  
“Joe from Paris” 
Another important event in this crisis occurred on September 19, 1960. In a 
telegram from CIA Headquarters to the Congo Station, there were orders to conduct an 
operation to assassinate Lumumba. The assassin introduced himself to Devlin as “Joe 
from Paris.” In Devlin’s meeting with “Joe,” it was revealed that “Joe” came to the 
Congo with poison to kill Lumumba.69 “Joe” was a CIA scientist with poison meant to 
exhibit similar symptoms to a native disease of the Congo. The poison was supposed to 
be slipped into his food or his toothpaste. Naturally, Devlin’s first question regarded 
around the authorization of the operation. The answer was clear, President Eisenhower 
had approved of the operation. This plot ultimately failed, as Devlin did not have a 
clear opening nor the will to conduct the operation. Devlin identifies some interesting 
concerns with pursing political transition via the Third World. He posits that 
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assassinations of foreign leaders hurts the United States’ legitimacy in the Third 
World.70   
The New Government 
The post-coup government was a troika made up of Mobutu, Bomboko and 
Victor Nendaka, the new director of the Sûreté Nationale. Lumumba was still under 
protection from the United Nations and received support from surrounding African 
countries like Ghana. In the Fall of 1960, Mobutu garnered political support from the 
Congolese. Like Lumumba, Mobutu was a gifted orator and appealed to an intelligencia 
of younger, college educated Congolese. Mobutu gained enough political capital to 
consider ignoring the United Nations protection of Lumumba. The new government 
was trying to find the most expedient path to silence Lumumba, who was the only 
legitimate threat to the coup. Mobutu’s eventual desire was to be a fully recognized 
head of state. According to CIA reports, the government “considered that Colonel 
Mobutu [did] not have sufficient administrative or political ability to run the 
government.”71 It was then decided that the United States should leverage moderate 
political elements to solidify a new government with Mobutu in a clear power position. 
The CIA had a systematic way to conduct a moderation effort to transition the coup to a 
legitimate democratic government that the United Nations could support. On 
November 27, 1960, the new government was again challenged as Lumumba escaped 
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In Office of Historian. 
Venkatraj 43 
 
into Katanga, which at this point was a pseudo-state. Lumumba was eventually killed 
by firing squad in January of 1960. Mobutu had cleared a path towards political 
supremacy in the Congo. 
The Gizenga Government 
In November 1960, a follower of Patrice Lumumba, Antoine Gizenga formed a 
new government in West Congo called the Free State of Congo. The Free State was 
supported financially by the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China.72 Even 
with the support of anti-Western factions, the Gizenga government ultimately failed 
because of a lack of military infrastructure and international support from international 
organizations like the United Nations. The importance of this event was that it 
represented another attempt from the Soviet Union to garner natural resources in 
Central Africa. 
Post-1960: Key Events 
Over the next four years, the United States, through political maneuvers like vote 
buying and financial support for pro-Western candidates was able to influence the 
internal politics of the Congo. To keep Mobutu under Western influence, America 
provided aid for the Congolese government under the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations. By 1963, after numerous clashes between the UNOC troops and 
Katanga forces, the United Nations was able to regain the Katanga province for the 
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Congolese government. With the Katanga situation stabilized, the United Nations left 
the Congo in 1963. Following the end of Katanga secession, there were political 
negotiations on the constitution of the Congo, which ushered in a modern 
governmental structure, centralizing more power on the presidency and doing away 
with dual executive power. Considering the new constitution, Kasavubu had the power 
to appoint an interim Prime Minister, turning to Tshombe.73 During this time two 
rebellions, the Simba and Kwilu rebellion, began in the Eastern part of the country. The 
philosophy of these movements has roots in Maoism and communism. The Johnson 
Administration intervened with hard power straying from the largely political influence 
that America had exercised in the region. After additional unrest post-March 1965 
elections, the United States government went on to support another successful coup 
attempt from Mobutu. From 1965, Mobutu preserved power over the country for the 
next four years.  
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Lessons Learned: Congo 
The thesis focused the scope of the history of the Congo on the early parts of the 
crisis. Political transition focused strategy on the prowess of the intelligence 
infrastructure in the region and the communication between headquarters and the 
station. The Congo provides an illustrative example on how the United States 
intelligence apparatus plays a key role in determining winners and losers in this 
conflict. First, the intelligence community often sets the objective of the conflict. The 
intelligence community, in cases of political upheaval, identifies what winning the 
conflict means in relation to the United States’ strategic interests. From the CIA 
telegrams cited earlier in the chapter, the intelligence community first determined that 
the Congo was of vital importance due to its abundance of natural resources. Extending 
this further, the CIA was also the first to identify Lumumba as a threat to the United 
States long term interests. Setting mission or success criteria fell to the judgement of the 
intelligence decision makers on the ground. In a proxy conflict, especially in a bipolar 
world or region, outright hard power intervention is almost never an option. Therefore, 
the early stages of political-based conflicts, rely heavily on intelligence decision making. 
The Congo Crisis also provides insight on the development of long-term political 
assets in the context of proxy wars. As stated before, denying the Soviet Union access to 
natural resources in the Congo represented the most important security interest for the 
United States. The intelligence community realized an investment needed to be made in 
the political future of the Congo. The investment calculus prioritized a pro-Western 
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government that would deny the natural resource to the Soviet Union. Devlin made this 
investment in Mobutu in September of 1960. He saw a clear anti-Soviet streak in 
Mobutu and took the opportunity to support his coup effort. Devlin’s colleagues 
defined an issue with Devlin’s strategy. The CIA chief was developing a cooperator 
rather than a pure political asset. The cooperator in this case lacks the incentive 
alignment necessary to take direct orders from the United States. To ensure incentive 
alignment, I argue that the United States, in a position against an established 
government, should pursue support for democratic revolutionaries rather than military-
based authoritarians. Apart from an idealistic rationale for supporting emerging 
democracies, there are practical reasons to support stable democratic efforts. For 
example, the lack of stable democratic ideals, including political participation of 
political and ethnic minorities, incited the Simba and Kwali rebellions. I argue that, after 
the death of Lumumba, the United States’ should have focused on political integration 
to maintain stability. The Congo was in a precarious position, with multiple ethno-
political secessions over a three-year period. The response from the United States 
should have been to provide the same sort of financial support for Mobutu with the 
caveat of democratic concessions. Since America offered Mobutu a cooperator 
relationship, it became difficult to maintain a quid pro quo relationship with Mobutu.  
This had adverse consequences as China and the Soviet Union successfully supported 
secession movements in resource-rich Eastern Congo. The overarching political goal of 
long-term assets focuses on stability which closes the door for future adversary 
involvement.  
Venkatraj 47 
 
Even though the Church Committee named the Congo Crisis one of the few Cold 
War successes, there were clear issues with the intelligence processing at the station 
level. Devlin supported a coup attempt without presidential approval, and from 
accounts around the president there seemed to be a lack of clarity on the direction of the 
conflict. Supporting a nebulous revolution was unnecessary and could have led to a 
disastrous engagement for the United States. Presidential authority and executive 
oversight are necessary to prevent mission creep, a term that defines incremental 
involvement in the conflict. With the introduction of clearer communication lines, the 
intelligence apparatus is able to share information rapidly. Proxy wars present 
environments that encourage risk taking, because the nation investing resources in the 
conflict is not sacrificing military forces. To mitigate some of the risk taking made by 
singular intelligence assets, the United States should follow clear, existing protocol on 
decision making. Without the existing chain of command, the United States can commit 
resources it cannot easily deploy or support engagements that warrant support far 
beyond what is initially thought. Clearly, the chain of command is needed to visualize 
the proverbial “bigger picture.” To be clear, the United States shouldn’t mistrust its 
intelligence officers on the ground. However, giving Station Chiefs and other lower 
level officers control over the direction of U.S. engagement in a proxy war can 
substantially damage the flexibility to exit the conflict. To deal with these pervasive 
conflicts, the United States has to incentivize clear communication across the command 
chain to avoid mission creep.  
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The Congo Crisis provides the United States a critical case study on how the 
intelligence community interacts with proxy conflicts. The early stages of a proxy war 
present an opportunity for the intelligence community to advance American interest, 
preempting the need for hard power and the escalation of violence. 
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Chapter V: The Strategic Matrix: Understanding the Themes 
 
What is the Strategic Matrix? 
The strategic matrix attempts to synthesize the lessons learned from previous 
conflicts and put forth a generalized set of considerations for decision makers in the 
Department of Defense, Congress, and the Executive. We can think about the strategic 
matrix as the initial considerations in the decision makers planning process. The reason 
for this sort of analysis is due to the lack of historical scholarship on general strategy in 
proxy wars and the view that serious, ensnaring proxy wars are black swans that 
require a solely off-cuff reactive approach. The strategic matrix takes into account the 
dichotomy between military-based strategies versus intelligence-based strategies. These 
strategies are definitely not mutually exclusive; however, in previous examples we 
found that conflicts usually rely more on one function.  
Mission Creep 
This thesis presumes that the United States is engaged or will have to engage in a 
proxy conflict. Mission creep represents a common trend among proxy wars mentioned 
in this thesis. Mission creep will be defined as an overextension of military or 
intelligence resources in a conflict. This trend should be one of the first notions that a 
decision maker needs to consider as they move forward with engagement. In the 
context of the military-based strategy, the focus should be on unified command. Unified 
command allows for streamlined decision making and for the military to better judge 
the commitment of resources. Unified command organizations, like JUSMAPG, can 
avoid escalation of commitment and provides organization for the military that the 
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United States’ is influencing. A military-based strategy in a proxy war requires an 
organized, multifaceted operation focused on objectives like proxy military overhaul, 
without overcommitting resources. 
In terms of the intelligence-based strategies, avoidance of mission creep relies on 
tamping down support for political cooperators and demanding or creating incentive 
alignment for the United States. The intelligence community should disincentivize 
“cowboy operations,” or operations that do not have proper authorization. Without the 
decision-making process codified in the intelligence community, the United States 
could find itself supporting a coup or a political party that requires the escalation of 
commitment. Though it seems obvious to use the proper channels to conduct 
intelligence operations, proxy wars put intelligence officers in a more difficult position 
that traditional conflict. Often times, the intelligence community has to gamble on 
political players in the region rather than tacit intelligence gathering. Developing 
political assets becomes trickier, because political support is often covert and runs 
counter to the rival’s political support.  
For U.S. engagement it is imperative to prevent overextension; but, in the case of 
proxy wars it becomes increasingly important. Proxy wars can entangle the United 
States’ resources for longer periods of time because American control is tempered by 
the existence of the proxy. Despite the idea of “war on the cheap,” these conflicts have a 
habit of requiring the United States to commit resources to achieve short-term 
objectives. Therefore, the decision makers should be conscious of mission creep.  
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Military-specific Considerations 
During a proxy war, military advisors will be tasked with overhauling the 
proxy's military capabilities and strategy. Like the JUSMAPG, a unified and 
multifaceted organization could provide a solution for proxy wars that require a 
military based strategy. 
 The first consideration for decision makers should be the political relationship 
between the power and the proxy. The power’s access to the existing and future 
capabilities is defined by the power’s ability to work with the proxy’s government. The 
resources provided by the power becomes efficiently allocated if the proxy’s 
government works with the power on removing barriers, obtaining buy-in from native 
military leaders, and legitimizing the advice from the power’s military advisor. 
Therefore, decision makers, if implementing a program like JUSMAPG, should unify 
the political and military decision when entering proxy wars. 
Second, implementing a unified organization should have a multifaceted 
approach. More specifically, military overhaul often warrants an extension of resources 
and can lead to a failure to fulfill long term objectives. Military overhaul should be 
focused on long-term stability and the setup of a pro-Western government. For 
example, during the Greek Civil War, economic aid provided important benefits for the 
short-term strategy implemented by military strategy. Controlling inflation was an 
important legitimizing factor for the government and U.S. involvement. Having 
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grassroots support for the government denies rebels or usurpers the ability to gain new 
recruits and promotes stability in the status quo. 
Finally, another consideration for a military strategy lies in overhauling military 
strategy. The media portrays military advisors as training operations, which are 
important when overhauling an army. However, more importantly the United States 
should ensure relationships with the proxy’s military at every echelon. This ensures 
that advisors can garner control to push or influence operations. Like in the Greek Civil 
War, knowledge of the inner-workings and inefficiencies that are present with the 
proxy wars can be revealed with a multilevel relationship between the organization and 
the proxy government. Furthermore, as this relationship develops, military advisors 
from the power begin to increase their influence over proxy’s military affairs. Increasing 
control over the proxy gives the power the ability to dictate military strategy, but more 
importantly if victory is in the cards, prevent human rights violations that threaten 
future stability. 
Intelligence-specific Considerations 
Often times in political-based conflicts, the advancement of the power’s interest 
relies on the intelligence community. The intelligence community -- in the context of a 
proxy war--supports political actors like parties or specific players. The use of the 
intelligence apparatus as the centerpiece of the proxy engagement strategy usually 
occurs during times when the proxy undergoes political transition. This fragile time in 
the history of a nation provides a perfect opportunity for rivals to engineer positive 
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outcomes that run counter the power’s interest. This phenomenon defined U.S. 
involvement in a number of proxy wars during the Cold War. In essence, the political 
situation often warrants an intelligence-based approach to intervention.  
A consideration for the intelligence community centers on incentive alignment. 
The United States, to ensure short-term and long-term objective fulfillment, should 
focus on building long-term pro-Western governments by developing assets rather than 
focusing on cooperators. The difference between an asset and cooperator centers on the 
alignment of incentives between the political actor and the power. The proxy-based 
political asset is incentivized, by the power, to take direct orders, and support the 
interests of the power regardless of length of time. However, a cooperator creates a 
mutual relationship that only supports the power for the short-term. This relationship 
yields less control for the power, but also avoids some risks that the thesis will address 
in the Risks portions of this chapter. In addition to control in the short term, the 
intelligence community, with an asset, can dictate terms of support for a future military 
intervention or political intervention. For most cases, it would be in the best interest for 
the power to develop assets in the proxies that the power chooses to use.  
A second intelligence consideration, related to the asset versus cooperator 
dichotomy, is continual, grassroots political development. This portion of strategy relies 
more on individual people rather than political parties or collective bodies of 
governance. To preface, one can think about this like a venture investment. These 
investments have lower chances of return; yet, can provide massive payoff if successful. 
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Similarly, the development of grassroots assets can “payoff” through pro-Western or 
pro-power sentiment from up and coming leaders. This should be a continual process, 
assuming a political transition to democracy. This also helps solves some of the tension 
between long-term and short-term strategic objectives for the power, ensuring future 
stable, pro-Western leaders in proxies that would be vital for advancing interests in the 
long term. 
 Risks of the Matrix 
This section will discuss two tensions that arise from generalizing a strategy on 
proxy wars. The first being the positive relationship between control and entanglement 
in the proxy war. Essentially, as the power seeks control of the intelligence and military 
operations, the power commits more resources, which further entangles the power in 
the conflict as to garner a “return on investment.”  
Many of the above recommendations seek to maximize control for the United 
States so as to optimize the value of resources into the conflict. However, entanglement 
acts as the counterbalance to control, in that the extension of control increases the 
reliance of the proxy on the power. Powers can rapidly commit resources to a proxy to 
receive compensatory control over the operations. For example, considering 
intelligence-based strategy, the development of an asset in high offices could increase 
reliance on the power and turn to the power for legitimacy. The alignment of incentives, 
inherent to an asset relationship, are often related to increasing resource commitment 
from the United States. Moreover, military overhaul, as described in the Greek Civil 
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War, maximizes control; yet, increases military reliance on the advisors of the power.  
Military advisor involvement can escalate the proxy conflict warranting an increase in 
resources from the power. Control over the proxy can force a power into a position 
where they ignore sunken costs and escalate resource commitment, further entangling 
the power in the conflict.   
 The second source of tension in proxy wars lies in divergence of long-term and 
short-term interests. The optimal proxy war outcome for the power is the alignment and 
fulfillment of interests disconnected from time. This would rarely be in the cards for the 
power. Therefore, the power must evaluate each decision, militarily and in the 
intelligence community, through the lens of short and long-term interests. For the 
Congo, the United States focused on the short-term interest of allowing the Soviet 
Union to absorb Central Africa into their sphere of influence. To achieve its short-term 
goal, the United States supported Mobutu and sacrificed long-term stability as seen 
through political instability that persists to this day. The United States could have 
balanced their support for Mobutu, the short-term, with future democratic concessions 
that could have further closed the door for Soviet involvement in Central Africa. This 
balance is harder for decision maker to account for because proxy wars feel like 
random, isolated events. Keeping the long-term interests in mind can clarify the 
allocation of resources and the terms of support for the United States. The Greek Civil 
War case study highlights an overlap between long-term and short-term interests. 
JUSMAPG forced all facets of the proxy war to be viewed through a single unified 
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structure that balanced a number of missions. This meant that the information moving 
into the organization was refined such that decision makers could implement a grand 
strategy that set up a pro-Western government.  
In summation, long-term and short-term interests are often at odds in these 
conflicts. One of the hardest tasks for decision makers will be understanding how to 
bridge the gap between the two time periods. This decreases the risk that the decision 
makers in the intelligence community and the military are implementing strategy that 
leads to regional instability or counter to any other long-term interest. 
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Chapter VI: Application to Yemen 
 
Last, we need to stress test the application of historical lessons learned to current 
proxy wars. To be clear, there are substantive differences between the Cold War 
environment versus the bipolar regionalism present in the Middle East currently. This 
section will take a similar approach as the previous case study; however, as this conflict 
remains ongoing the thesis will only briefly diagram the beginning of the conflict. 
Instead of dissecting lessons learned, we will attempt to stress test the conclusions 
drawn from the strategic matrix. 
Before diagramming the conflict, it is pertinent to discuss the coverage the 
Yemen Crisis has received. The Trump administration has had a generally positive 
relationship with Saudi Arabia, so criticism of Saudi actions has been relatively quiet. 
News cycles have tended to focus on internal political affairs, with foreign policy 
discussions centered on relations with Russia and China. Yemen has been put on the 
back burner by the American political consciousness as a remnant of the Arab Spring. In 
reality, since January 2016, 60,000 Yemeni people have been killed, and international 
organizations have called the conflict the “world’s worst humanitarian crisis.”74 On top 
of the proxy conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the Yemeni people have suffered 
from a famine that has left thousands of dead. Appendix B75 gives us a spatial 
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Jeremy Sharp. 
75 Walsh, Declan. "The Tragedy of Saudi Arabia's War in Yemen." The New York Times. October 
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understanding of the hunger crisis. The Obama and Trump administrations have called 
for a political solution to the problem; however, the two opposing sides fundamentally 
disagree on the framework and the terms of the agreement.76 More recently, the Senate 
recently passed a joint resolution to remove U.S. military assistance in Yemen.77  
The Conflict 
The first signs of conflict began in 2011, alongside the Arab spring. Political 
unrest took the form of popular youth protests aimed at removing President Ali 
Abdullah Saleh. By 2012, a coalition of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the UN 
Security Council had put forth a transition plan to transfer power to Abdu Rabbu 
Mansour Hadi who was the Vice President at the time. While President Hadi attempted 
to enact political change, the northern based Houthi rebel group planned to change 
political order with the use of force.78 The Houthi movement (also known as Ansar 
Allah or Partisans of God) is a predominantly Zaydi Shiite insurgent group.79 Iran’s 
support for the Houthi’s have religiopolitical implications. Iran and Saudi Arabia have 
religious differences based on the Shiite-Sunni divide. Yet, this fight has more to do 
with regional hegemony. Recently, the Iran-Saudi Arabia conflict has intensified for a 
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number of reasons including U.S. involvement in Iraq during the 2000s and the Arab 
Spring in 2011. 
 By 2014, Houthi rebels took control of Sanaa, the capital of Yemen. In 2015, the 
Houthi rebels continued the assault South, violating existing power sharing 
agreements. By March 2015, President Hadi had fled to Saudi Arabia, while the House 
of Saud scrambled to put together an international coalition to repel the Houthi forces 
and limit Iran’s influence in Yemen. Though there was the Stockholm Agreement and 
Hudayah Cease Fire in late 2018, the fighting has resumed, and there is evidence that 
the Houthi rebels have begun to use drones to attack government forces.80 The use of 
drones and technology from non-state actors could mean the spread of the conflict past 
Yemen’s borders.81 Iranian involvement has been mostly weapons support including 
ballistic missiles and UAV. Also, Iran seems to have invested less in the conflict; 
however, support from Iran has caused internal budget issues and exacerbates an 
ongoing currency crisis.82 
U.S. involvement in Yemen 
In the early days of the conflict, political support was the limit of American 
involvement in the proxy war. For example, as stated above, the United States ensured 
the transition from Saleh to Hadi. So as part of the Saudi coalition, America had 
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participated in regime change. Furthermore, in 2015, the Obama Administration 
established “a Joint Planning Cell with Saudi Arabia to coordinate U.S. military and 
intelligence support.”83 U.S. CENTCOM personnel were deployed to provide related 
support, and U.S. mid-air refueling of coalition aircraft began in April 2015 and ended 
in November 2018.84 Additionally, during this period from 2015-2018, Saudi Arabia has 
conducted naval and special forces operations in Yemen. In December of 2018, the 
Trump administration, which has close ties to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin 
Salman, announced, that the U.S. military aid would: 
“continue to provide military advice and limited information, logistics, and other 
support to regional forces combatting the Houthi insurgency in Yemen; however, 
aerial refueling of regional forces’ aircraft ended in November 2018.”85 
In this conflict, the United States provides intelligence, military advice, and logistics to 
the Saudis and Emiratis. 
Along with the proxy conflict, the Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) and 
Islamic State affiliates have wreaked havoc on the people and political institutions of 
Yemen. CENTCOM has conducted 36 airstrikes and counting on strategic objectives in 
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Yemen since 2019.86 The Trump administration has justified the use of airstikes as an 
extension of national interest post 9/11.  
The United States has also attempted to address the underlying humanitarian 
crisis. Between 2017 and 2018, the United States has committed $720.8 million in 
emergency humanitarian aid for Yemen.87 In 2019, the Hudaydah port has presented a 
unique problem for USAID, since the port city is vital for moving goods in and out of 
the country. Appendix C88 gives a complete breakdown of USAID flowing into the 
country. On top of the starvation, a massive cholera outbreak has ravaged the 
population in Yemen. Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH), supported by the Saudi-
coalition and the international community, has begun operations to solve some of the 
source issues of the cholera outbreak. The aforementioned efforts only represent a 
handful of the operations and organizations receiving aid from the United States. 
Application to the Strategic Matrix 
To conduct the stress test of the strategic matrix, we will consider the conflict 
from the point of view of the decision maker entering the proxy war. First, we need to 
define the objective. In this case, The United States’ goal would be to deny the spread of 
Iran’s influence in the Middle East. From rhetoric and media put out by both 
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administrations, the importance our national interest in Yemen is suspect. Second, we 
need to make the distinction between military and intelligence-based strategies.  
At the beginning of the conflict, the United States structured the transition to 
President Hadi. This would fall under the grassroots political development under 
intelligence-based strategies. Hadi was not the reformer that the country needed, nor 
did he have the political capital. Instead of focusing on the political actor in question, 
the United States subsumed the Saudis plan to install a northern-Sunni leader with 
name recognition. Essentially, the intelligence community had and still have a failed 
political asset because of a lack of due diligence related to American interests tied to 
Mohammad Bin Salman. To be fair, the Hadi government had to fight an uphill battle 
against a coalition of Iran, the Houthis, and Saleh supporters who would be expelled 
from the coalition in 2014. Taking a secondary role seemed like the best course of action 
in terms of diplomatic relations. The United States made a critical mistake by taking a 
back seat to the Saudi’s in terms of intelligence operations. To ensure a clear path the 
victory, the United States should have either committed more resources in the early 
days of the conflict or disengaged from the conflict entirely. Controlling information 
flow would give American decision-makers better control over political asset choice; a 
clear failure of the Saudi operation. 
 As far as a forward-looking political strategy, the United States needs to start 
investing in new grassroots political leaders that can unite the country in the future. The 
Hadi government has fragmented and the United States needs to begin the cycle of 
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developing future assets.89 The grassroots political development would be high-risk; 
however, if we assume that we have a national interest in Yemen, we can no longer 
support Hadi as the solution to Yemen’s problem.  
As we move along in the crisis, we start to foray from a political or intelligence-
based strategy to a military-based strategy in the latter portion of the Obama 
Administration. Though substantive details on the Joint Planning Cell with Saudi 
Arabia are unclear, outcomes from the beginning of the conflict until now create a 
picture of disorganization. The military strategy in place seemed to run through Saudi 
Arabia, as they provided the forces for offensive operations in Yemen. Additionally, 
rhetoric from the Obama and Trump administrations has made it clear to an 
increasingly isolationist electorate that U.S. military aid would be relatively hands off. 
Airstrikes which have been the primary mode of direct intervention have been directed 
at AQAP targets rather than Houthi targets. The lack of unified command and reliance 
on Saudi military operations have been a losing strategy for the United States. If we 
assume that we are committed to the national interest of denying power to Iran, ending 
organizations like the Joint Cell with the Saudi government substantively damages the 
ability for the United States to influence operations in the proxy. U.S. military advisors 
have been subsequently hamstrung by the fragmentation of the Hadi Administration. 
The benefit of the unified command organizations revolves around integration of 
political and military support. Simply put, militarily we are taking our queues from the 
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Saudi government, and it is a strategy that has not worked. A unified command, 
advanced by the United States, could better train Yemeni military forces, be in position 
for a military overhaul, and influence strategy from local and Saudi forces 
Military oversight of aid has also been lackluster. One of the objectives of the 
Joint Cell was overseeing the allocation of aid. This became increasingly complicated 
with fighting with impediments at the port of Hudaydah. Rather than intelligence and 
USAID oversight, a unified military command to oversee aid shows the international 
community that the United States is committed to stabilization of the humanitarian 
crisis. Moreover, a unified command allows the United States to enforce proper aid 
distribution far beyond USAID or the United Nations. To be clear, this should not be 
done unilaterally so as not to emulate an Iraq-esque invasion of Yemen. Instead, the 
United States should renegotiate the Joint Cell agreement, demanding more authority 
over local and Saudi forces so as to ensure aid is getting to the right places at the right 
time. 
We see a common thread between the military and intelligence-based strategies. 
We have a commit or lose problem. Often times, taking ancillary roles in the proxy war 
leaves the power without the power to dictate the outcome of the conflict. This is not to 
say that the power should intervene in every case. Instead, the power must be careful in 
determining whether they should intervene in the first place and the objective or 
interest is worth committing resources too.  
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The United States needs to be involved militarily in the day-to-day operations of 
the proxy war. If we are not willing to make a commitment, then we should approve 
the Senate resolution and abandon our objectives in Yemen. Taking the middle ground 
has been detrimental for overall strategy toward the Saudi coalition.  
Risk Assessment 
  As previously stated, the bipolar environment that gives rise to the Yemen 
Conflict and the Cold War environment are inherently different. Initially, the Cold War 
was due to world-wide bipolarity that was rooted in ideological differences, impacting 
almost every continent. On the other hand, the current bipolar conflict takes on 
underlying sectarianism and vying for power on a smaller scale. We can think of the 
Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry as bipolarity within a region rather than the world. This 
difference matters because the Yemen conflict has less coverage from the international 
community. Looking at the Congo Crisis and the Greek Civil War, the Soviet Union and 
United States went to war in the Security Council, using political maneuvers to change 
opinions in the First and Third World. Additionally, the proxies, during the Cold War, 
were in transition because of a notable world event: World War II. There are a number 
of ways to rationalize the transition of Yemen; yet, none of them involve the upheaval 
of the world order. Finally, the political willingness to commit U.S. resources has 
drastically changed post-Iraq War. The Middle East, to Americans, seems like an 
unwinnable sectarian conflict. That being said, proxy wars need Congressional or 
public support, which was readily available to the Truman Doctrine. 
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 As for risks related to the matrix, the United States needs to identify how the 
objective relates to the vested interest. Rhetoric and hesitance from both the Trump and 
Obama administrations indicates that the calculus on Iran controlling Yemen remains 
unclear. Additionally, the Senate resolution reveals a similar line of thinking, in that the 
politics of war are negative unless the Trump administration provides detail on the 
implications of losing the Yemen Conflict.90 The lack of definition relates to 
comprehending the trade-offs between our short-term and long-term interests. The 
short-term interest of reducing death toll and saving the vestiges of Hadi administration 
maybe at odds with long-term interests such as regional stability and preventing the 
rise of Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula. Essentially, the Trump administration has to 
define the short-term outlook strategy on Iran, and cross reference that to a strategic 
matrix on how to proceed. If the goal is to win the conflict, I recommend that the United 
States start pushing their short-term interest; denying the growth of Iran’s sphere of 
interest. This requires increased commitment from the United States. As for long term 
interests, as per the matrix, I would recommend finding political assets rather than 
cooperators. This hedges against the situation of Iran winning the proxy war. Finding 
political assets would allow the United States to have strong allies in the event of a 
future crisis. 
 The strategic matrix could be an interesting lens through which to view the 
Yemen Conflict. The matrix does give the United States a strategic path forward, but 
                                                            
90 Levine, Marianne, Heather Caygle, and Andrew Desiderio. "Senate Fails to Override Trump's 
Veto on Yemen." POLITICO. May 02, 2019. Accessed May 13, 2019.  
Venkatraj 67 
 
there are risks associated with pursuing this path including justifying future political 
upheaval and emboldening Iran or AQAP. 
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Chapter VII: Conclusion 
 
 The proxy war has always been a method of warfare for powerful societies to 
advance security interests. With the rise of the non-state actor and economic 
interdependence, state-to-state war has given way to the use of proxies because it 
hedges the risks of direct engagement. Proxy wars are cheaper both politically and 
economically. As we have seen, engaging with proxies allows for different risks that can 
destabilize a region and lead to massive humanitarian issues. Proxy wars are 
operationally opaque as its hard to pin down what or who you are supporting. That 
being said, decision-makers have to refrain from viewing these conflicts as outliers. 
Instead, we need to learn from past successes and failures to standardize how we 
engage in these conflicts. Standardization of process, through military and intelligence 
operations, will begin to standardize our outcomes. 
 The strategic matrix does achieve some standardization, but still fails in some 
areas. The matrix gives us some guideline considerations when dealing with a proxy. 
Despite these considerations, the guidelines could be enriched by discussing the rival 
power and their internal weaknesses. Adding the rival to the equation would add an 
important dimension to the matrix that would improve the validity of the findings. 
Further, understanding the breakdown or mix between intelligence and military 
considerations could improve the validity. Identifying this breakdown would refine 
decision making from available information. 
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 In terms of refining the strategic matrix and improving the thesis, we could 
consider more data points in the Cold War. The strategic matrix functions very much 
like a statistical model, in that the larger the sample size the more refined the model 
becomes. As we analyze more scenarios, we derive more failures and successes, 
meaning we can better formulate a strategy based on the matrix. If I could propose one 
conclusion it would be that the United States needs some sort of model to determine 
how to better engage in these volatile conflicts.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A.  
 
Citation: "Map Regions and Prefectures." Map of the Regions and Prefectures of Greece. 
Accessed May 12, 2019. https://www.sfakia-crete.com/sfakia-crete/prefecturesregions.html. 
*For reference, the Roumeli region is shaded blue. 
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Appendix B. 
 
 
Citation: Walsh, Declan. "The Tragedy of Saudi Arabia's War in Yemen." The New York Times. 
October 26, 2018. Accessed May 12, 2019. 
 
 
 
Venkatraj 72 
 
 
 
Appendix C. 
Citation: United States. Congressional Research Service. Yemen: Civil War and Regional 
Intervention. By Jeremy Sharp. 
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